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Abstract
We conducted a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In
the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to
contributing nothing to provide a pure public good.  In the second stage, knowing the
other subject's commitment decision, subjects who selected not to commit in the first stage
choose contributions to the public good. We found no support for the evolutionary stable
strategy equilibrium, and the ratio of subjects who did not commit to contributing nothing
increased as rounds advanced; that is, the free-riding rate declined over time.
Furthermore, this behavior did not arise due to altruism or kindness among subjects, but
from spiteful behavior of subjects.
Correspondent:
Until July 31, 2003
Tatsuyoshi Saijo
228-77 Humanities and Social Sciences
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, CA 91125
USA
Phone 1-626-395-4216 (phone and fax)
E-mail: saijo@hss.caltech.edu
From August 1, 2003
Tatsuyoshi Saijo
Institute of Social and Economic Research
Osaka University
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
Phone 81-6 (country & area codes)
879-8582 (office)/878-2766 (fax)
E-mail: saijo@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp
1 
1. Introduction 
Research on public goods has been one of the most important economic problems after 
Samuelson (1954). A pure public good is characterized by the following two properties: (1) non-
excludability: no agent can be excluded from consuming the public good, and (2) non-
rivalriness: consumption of the public good by one agent does not decrease the quantity 
available for consumption by any other agents (see Samuelson (1954) and Musgrave and 
Musgrave (1973)). Although both mechanism designers and experimentalists have been 
investigating efficient provision of public goods, their focus is frequently on excludable public 
goods. The reason is that free-riders are easily excluded from the benefit of public goods 
through an organization such as a club. However, the problems arising from non-excludability 
are increasingly important in many practical circumstances, such as for international treaties.  
A recent example is the Kyoto Protocol to cope with global warming and climate 
change. It took years to agree on the basic framework, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to reduce the green house gases. UNFCCC was 
adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. The parties of UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997. The Protocol is a mechanism in our terminology to attain the aim of 
UNFCCC. As of September 2002, 84 parties including the U.S.A. have signed the Protocol, and 
93 parties have either ratified or acceded to it. In March 2001, however, President Bush 
announced not to ratify the Protocol because it is detrimental to the U.S. economy. This could 
limit the effectiveness of the Protocol.1  
Voluntary public goods provision by individuals -- such as for public broadcasting -- 
also faces a similar problem.  For example, a part of public broadcasting in Japan is supported 
by the public broadcasting fee.  Every family must pay the fee by law, but many choose not to 
and enjoy the benefit of the public broadcasting that is non-excludable, since enforcement is 
practically non-existent.  A natural question to ask is what would happen if we allow agents to 
commit to contributing nothing before they play the voluntary contribution mechanism. 
                                                     
1 Another contemporary example is the chemical weapons convention (CWC). It took 24 years to reach 
agreement on the disposition of chemical weapons, and the number of countries signing the CWC was more 
than 160 by the end of 1995. The CWC entered into force in April 1997, following ratification by 65 signatories. 
The CWC is a mechanism creating a public good, i.e., a greater likelihood of world peace. However, several 
countries suspected of developing chemical weapons, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and 
Syria, have not yet ratified the CWC.  This could limit the effectiveness of the CWC. The League of Nations is 
also an example.  Following World War I President Woodrow Wilson strongly supported the League, but the 
U.S. Congress never ratified the Treaty of Versailles and so the U.S. never joined the League. 
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Mechanism designers such as Groves and Ledyard (1977), Hurwicz (1979), Walker 
(1981) and Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and their followers constructed mechanisms achieving 
Pareto efficient outcomes with several other normative criteria, but all agents in these 
mechanisms must play a strategy specified in them. That is, agents do not have freedom to not 
play any strategy so that they can free-ride on the benefit from the pure public good provided 
by others. Experimentalists also conducted experiments on the provision of public goods, and 
their main focus is on the voluntary contribution mechanism.2  All subjects in the experiments 
must choose a number corresponding to the amount of contributions.  Although zero 
contribution is often an option, subjects cannot refuse to choose a number and at the same time 
enjoy the benefit from the public goods. 
Recently, Saijo and Yamato (1999, 2001) shed a new light on this aspect of pure public 
good provision mechanisms. For example, in the voluntary contribution mechanism, agents 
may have a choice to commit to contributing nothing before they play the game, and hence 
some of them can commit to free-ride. Saijo and Yamato (2001) proved an impossibility 
theorem stating that it is impossible to design a mechanism where all agents choose to commit 
to play the game in very reasonable environments.3 
This paper reports an experiment in which non-excludability is explicitly incorporated 
in the voluntary contribution mechanism. The following are the major features that distinguish 
it from other public goods experiments.   
First, in order to introduce non-excludability, we set up a model of the voluntary 
contribution mechanism with pre-commitment in a two-stage game following Saijo and 
Yamato (1999).  In the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they 
commit to contributing nothing to provide a pure public good.  In the second stage, knowing 
the other subject's commitment decision, subjects who selected not to commit in the first stage 
choose contributions to the public good.  In our experiments, we conducted two treatments.  In 
the control Treatment A both subjects could not commit to contributing nothing. This 
treatment corresponds to the usual public good experiments that do not have the first stage, 
                                                     
2 Another line of experimental research in public goods is to investigate performance of mechanisms achieving 
Pareto efficient outcomes such as the Groves-Ledyard mechanism.  As Chen and Plott (1996) show, the 
Groves-Ledyard mechanism works very well under some suitable punishment parameters.  But all agents 
must play strategies specified in the mechanism, consistent with the mechanism that they evaluate. 
3 See also Dixit and Olson (2000), Moulin (1986), and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984). 
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and consist of the second stage only.  In Treatment B each subject could choose her 
commitment decision before her contribution decision, Treatment B included both stages. 
Second, we employed a non-linear payoff function rather than the linear payoff function 
used in most of the previous experiments.4  Subjects receive payoffs based on a Cobb-Douglas 
transformation of their consumption of the public good and their private good.  In our design, 
two subjects have the same non-linear payoff function. Therefore, the equilibrium outcome is 
interior rather than on the boundary of the strategy space. 
Third, we designed experiments in which the information is as complete as possible. 
We explained to subjects that everyone has the same payoff table and the same initial holdings.  
In addition, everyone knew the total number of repetitions. Moreover, we provided a payoff 
table called a detailed table that has complete payoff information and is qualitatively different 
from the payoff tables of previous experiments, which we call rough tables.5 Our detailed table 
has information of two dimensions due to the non-linearity of the payoff function. Most of 
previous experiments used rough tables that have information of one dimension. We did not 
provide population feedback, however, regarding choices of other subjects outside the players 
own current pairing.  For example, information on commitment decisions in the first stage in 
Treatment B is common knowledge between paired subjects, but no pair learns the 
commitment or contribution decisions of other pairs. 
Fourth, we used two subjects rather than many subjects. The purpose of this design 
feature is twofold. First, we wanted to study the strategic behavior of subjects in a most simple 
environment. Second, we wanted an environment that fit well to the basic evolutionary game 
theory: each treatment had twenty subjects and each subject was randomly paired with each 
other subject one at a time – a so-called “strangers” design.  The same game was repeated 19 
rounds, 4 for practice and 15 for monetary reward, so as not to pair the same two subjects more 
than once. 
Fifth, we asked subjects several questions such as, what is “your reason for your 
decision on your investment number?” in each round rather than only after the end of a 
                                                     
4 Andreoni (1993) used a Cobb-Douglas payoff function and a detailed payoff table that we will explain later.  
Isaac and Walker (1998) and Sefton and Steinberg (1996) used quasi-linear payoff functions with rough payoff 
tables. See Laury and Holt (2002) for a survey of these and other voluntary contribution game studies with 
interior Nash equilibria. 
5 Saijo and Nakamura (1995) compared the effects of detailed payoff tables with rough payoff tables for a 
public goods environment with linear payoff functions.  
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session. This method has advantages and disadvantages. Subjects might be able to justify what 
they did after the end of a session, but they might not be able to do so at each round. Of course, 
these types of questions in each round might distract subjects from their decision process or 
encourage them to focus on self-justification or rationalization. But the questions might also 
promote more thoughtful decisions. 
The above features of the experiment allow us to classify all strategies into three 
categories in the second stage: own payoff-maximizing, altruistic, and spiteful. If subject 2 
commits contributing nothing in the first stage and subject 1 does not, subject 1 who can 
choose a public good investment number has three possible strategies. Subject 1’s best 
response (that maximizes her own payoff) to the zero investment of subject 2 is called an own 
payoff-maximizing strategy. 
 On the other hand, subject 1 could invest more than the own payoff-maximizing 
strategy investment so that both subjects could enjoy an even higher level of the public good. 
Since subject 1’s investment level exceeds the own payoff-maximizing level, subject 1 suffers 
payoff loss comparing with the own payoff-maximizing strategy.  We call this strategy an 
altruistic strategy. In our payoff setting, every investment strategy that exceeds the own payoff-
maximizing strategy falls into this category. 
Another type of strategy is to invest less than the own payoff-maximizing strategy. 
Although subject 1 suffers payoff loss when she reduces the level of public good relative to her 
own payoff-maximizing investment, subject 2 suffers an even greater payoff loss than subject 1 
does. This is because some reduction of investment from the own payoff-maximizing strategy 
does not hurt subject 1 much due to the first order condition at the own payoff-maximizing 
strategy.6 We call this strategy a spiteful strategy. In our payoff setting, almost every investment 
strategy less than the own payoff-maximizing strategy satisfies this condition. 
When neither subject commits to the zero investment, all strategies can be basically 
classified into these three categories in the same manner.  
The Prisoners’ Dilemma game represents the typical linear voluntary contribution 
mechanism without pre-commitment. However, in our two stage game setting, the normal 
form game representation of the first stage commitment decision is a Hawk-Dove game rather 
than the Prisoners' Dilemma game. As usual, this Hawk-Dove game has two pure strategy 
                                                     
6 For the maximizing agent (subject 1), the difference between the payoff at the maximum and the payoff at a 
strategy close to the maximum is small since the payoff function is approximately flat at the maximum. 
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Nash equilibria and one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium which is the unique evolutionarily 
stable strategy (ESS) equilibrium. 
 We observed the following results. In Treatment A, subjects on average contributed (or 
"invested") close to but slightly below the interior Nash equilibrium level, because some 
subjects selected apparently spiteful investment strategies so as to reduce their opponent's 
payoff more than their own payoff reduction.7  Based upon different models of subject 
expectations regarding the contribution choices of the other subject, we found that 44-50% of 
choices are spiteful, 42-49% are own payoff-maximizing, and 8-12% are altruistic. For 
comparison, if subjects choose strategies randomly, 22.4% of choices are spiteful, 4.2% are own 
payoff-maximizing, and 73.4% are altruistic. That is, spiteful behavior prevailed among 
subjects who were not own payoff-maximizing.  Moreover, the investment levels did not get 
closer to the Nash equilibrium level over time.  
Our results are different from those in standard public goods experiments with linear 
payoff functions, where investments usually exceed the Nash equilibrium level in early 
periods but decline and approach the Nash equilibrium level over time. However, since 
investing zero is a dominant strategy with linear payoff functions, subjects can only contribute 
greater than or equal to the Nash equilibrium level of no investment.  In other words, every 
strategy is either own payoff-maximizing or altruistic and no spiteful strategy is available with 
linear payoff functions. On the other hand, with Cobb-Douglas type payoff functions, own 
payoff-maximizing, spiteful, and altruistic strategies can all be selected.  This is one reason 
why our results with non-linear payoff functions differ from those in standard public goods 
experiments with linear payoff functions. 
 In Treatment B, it is made explicit to subjects that free-riding is an option (i.e., subjects 
can commit to investing nothing in the first stage).  Hence, one might expect more free-riding 
than in the usual voluntary contribution mechanism experiments in which a typical 
contribution pattern is early-period cooperation with eventual decay toward the free-riding 
outcome. However, we observed in Treatment B that the non-commitment rate, which is the 
ratio of the number of non-committing subjects to the total number of subjects, rose as rounds 
                                                     
7 Saijo and Nakamura (1995) observed spiteful behavior in a traditional voluntary contribution mechanism 
experiment.  See also Ito, Saijo, and Une (1995).  Spiteful behavior is also observed in biology.  Iwasa, 
Nakamaru, and Levin (1998) set up a model explaining spiteful behavior of colicin-producing bacteria against 
colicin-sensitive bacteria. 
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advanced. In other words, the free-riding rate declined over time. Moreover, the average 
investment in the final rounds in Treatment B was very close to that in Treatment A.  
Consequently, in the final two-thirds of Treatment B, subjects' non-commitment rates nearly 
always exceeded the ESS equilibrium non-commitment rate. 
Why did this happen? A typical subject, say subject 1, behaved as follows. In the early 
periods subject 1 committed to investing zero, expecting high payoff with free-riding.  
However, her opponent, subject 2 who decided not to commit to investing zero, did not choose 
the own payoff-maximizing investment strategy.  Instead, subject 2 often took a spiteful 
strategy by investing a smaller amount so as to reduce subject 1's payoff more than subject 2’s 
payoff reduction.  In fact, 68.4% of investment strategies chosen when the opponents commit 
to investing zero were spiteful, 30.9% are own payoff-maximizing, and 0.7% are altruistic. This 
spiteful behavior is unusual since spiteful subjects knew that they would not play the same 
subjects again in our experimental design.  That is, the “punishment” through spitefulness 
could not have direct influence on payoffs in the following rounds.  Rather, it could have had 
only an indirect effect.   
The committing subject learned and expected that commitment to investing zero was 
not beneficial to her because of the spiteful behavior response by non-committing subjects, and 
hence she began regularly not committing. That is, it seemed that the reason why the ratio of 
non-committing subjects increases is not altruism or kindness, but instead is a strategic 
response to the spiteful behavior of other subjects. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the 
voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without pre-commitment to contributing zero.  
Section 3 describes the experimental design.  We present the results of the experiment on the 
voluntary contribution mechanism without pre-commitment in Section 4 and those of the 
experiment on the voluntary contribution mechanism with pre-commitment in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes.    
 
2. The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism  
2.1. The Basic Model 
 There are two subjects, a and b, and subject i (=a,b) has wi  units of initial endowment 
of a private good.  Each subject faces a decision of splitting wi  between her own consumption 
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of the private good ( xi ) and investment ( yi ).  From the investment, each subject receives 
y y y wa b y= + + , where wy  is the initial level of the pubic good.  That is, the level of the 
public good is the sum of the investments of two subjects and the initial level of the public 
good.  Therefore, each subject's decision problem is  
max ( , )u x yi i  subject to x y wi i i+ = , 
where u x yi i( , )  is subject i's payoff function.  We use a Cobb-Douglas type payoff function to 
transform contributions and the private good into subject payoffs, and all subjects have the 
same payoff function.  That is, u x y x yi i i( , ) =
−α α1 , where α ∈( , ).0 1   Using a monotonic 
transformation, we specify the payoff function as follows:  
(1)                                       u x y x yi i i( , )
{ }
= +
−α α β1
50
500 . 
We set ( , , ) ( , , )w w wa b y = 24 24 3 , α = 0 47. , and β = 4 45. .  With these parameters the Nash 
equilibrium investment pair of the voluntary contribution mechanism is (  ,  )y ya b  
= ( . , . )7 69 7 69  and the payoff is u x yi i(  ,  ) = 7089 , where  . .xi = − =24 7 69 16 31 and 
   .y y y wa b y= + + = 18 38 . The Pareto efficient level of the public good is determined uniquely 
by the Samuelson condition and the feasibility condition.  Its symmetric contribution level is 
12.02.  Therefore, the Pareto efficient level of the public good is 27.04=12.02+12.02+3.  Clearly, 
the level of the public good with the voluntary contribution mechanism is less than the Pareto 
efficient level of the public good. 
 In our experiment, subjects choose integer investment numbers only.  The detailed 
payoff table used in the experiment is Table 1: the rows are for the subject's own investment 
numbers and the columns are for the other subject's investment numbers.  If your opponent’s 
investment number is 8, your own payoff is maximized by investing 8.  The same thing holds 
for your opponent who has the same payoff table.  In other words, the Nash equilibrium of this 
game is for each subject to contribute 8 and obtain a payoff of 7345.  No other Nash equilibria 
sneak into our model due to the discrete strategy choice set.   
 
-------------------------------- 
Table 1 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
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2.2  Classification of Strategies: Own Payoff-Maximizing, Spiteful, and Altruistic Strategies 
The Nash equilibrium analysis in the above subsection is based on the assumption of 
own payoff-maximizing behavior: each subject chooses a strategy maximizing her own payoff. 
However, it has been observed in many experiments on the voluntary contribution mechanism 
that subjects select different types of strategies such as altruistic and spiteful ones. Therefore, it 
is useful to introduce formal definitions of spiteful strategies as well as altruistic strategies in 
the voluntary contribution mechanism.  We regard own payoff-maximizing behavior as a 
standard of comparison, and then classify all possible strategies into three regions.  
 (i) A subject is said to choose an own payoff-maximizing strategy if she selects a 
strategy maximizing her own payoff, given an expected strategy of the other subject. 
 (ii) A subject is said to choose a spiteful strategy if she selects a strategy reducing both 
her own payoff and the other subject’s payoff in comparison to the payoffs when she takes an 
own payoff-maximizing strategy, given an expected strategy of the other subject.  
(iii) A subject is said to choose an altruistic strategy if she selects a strategy reducing her 
own payoff, but increasing the other subject’s payoff in comparison to the own payoff-
maximizing payoffs, given an expected strategy of the other subject. 
 Given any expected value of the other subject’s investment number, every possible 
investment strategy that a subject can choose is regarded as one of three strategies mentioned 
above.  Table 2 illustrates how strategies are classified in our setting.  For example, suppose 
that a subject expects her opponent to choose 8.  Then:  
(i) Investing 8 is an own payoff-maximizing strategy. In this case, both subjects get 7345 
(see the number in cell c of Table 2 when the choice of the subject is 8 and the choice of her 
opponent is 8).   
(ii) Investing less than 8 is a spiteful strategy. For instance, if the subject invests 6 
instead of 8, her own payoff is reduced from 7345 to 7237 (the number in cell d  of Table 2 
when the choice of the subject is 6 and the choice of her opponent is 8)), and the payoff of her 
opponent is also reduced from 7345 to 5766 (the number in cell e ).  
(iii) Investing more than 8 is an altruistic strategy. For example, by investing 16 instead 
of 8, her own payoff is reduced from 7345 to 4179 (the number in cell f ), while the payoff of 
the other subject increases from 7345 to 16179 (the number in cell g ). 
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For any given investment number of the other subject, investing less than an own 
payoff-maximizing number is a spiteful strategy, and investing more than it is an altruistic 
strategy. In Table 2 the own payoff-maximizing strategy region represents 4.16%(=26/625) of 
the cells, the spiteful strategy region is 22.40%(=140/625) of the cells, and the altruistic strategy 
region is 73.4%(=459/625) of the cells.    
 
-------------------------------- 
Table 2 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Moreover, spiteful strategies can be divided in two categories. A spiteful strategy that 
causes a reduction of your opponent’s payoff that is smaller than one’s own payoff reduction is 
called a weakly spiteful strategy.  For example, when the expected investment number of your 
opponent is 18, by investing 1 instead of 3, you can reduce the payoff of your opponent from 
2027 (cell h of Table 2) to 1743 (cell i). But the reduction of your opponent’s payoff, 284=2027-
1743, is smaller than your own payoff reduction, 311=21474-21163 (compare cell j and cell k). In 
Table 2, however, the number of such weakly spiteful strategies is only 12.  For the other 128 
spiteful strategies, the reduction of the opponent’s payoff is larger than the own payoff 
reduction.  
Whether an investment choice of a subject is own payoff-maximizing, spiteful, or 
altruistic depends on how much she expects the other subject to invest. We will consider 
several possible expectations in Sections 4 and 5 when classifying behavior into spiteful, 
altruistic and own payoff-maximizing categories. 
 
2.3.  Linear versus Non-Linear Payoff Functions 
Both spiteful and altruistic strategies can be selected in our model with non-linear 
Cobb-Douglas type payoff functions.  However, this is not the case when payoff functions are 
linear: only own payoff-maximizing and altruistic strategies can be chosen and no spiteful 
strategy is available.  
Suppose that two subjects have the same linear payoff function: 
u x y w y y y w y yi i i i i j i i j= + = − + + = − − +β β β β( ) ( )1 , where 0 1< <β  and i j a b i j, , ;= ≠ . 
Figure 1-(a) illustrates how strategies are classified with linear indifference curves, where the 
horizontal axis is subject i’s consumption of the private good, x w yi i i= − , and the vertical axis 
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is the level of the public good, y y yi j= + .  It is well-known that investing zero is a dominant 
strategy, that is, given any investment level of the other subject, y wj j∈[ , ]0 , yi = 0  ( x wi i= ) is 
subject i’s own payoff-maximizing strategy subject to the constraint y w x yi i j= − + .  Also, it is 
easy to check that contributing any positive amount, y wi i∈( , ]0 , is an altruistic strategy. Note 
that there is no spiteful strategy available in this case.  
On the other hand, both spiteful and altruistic strategies are available when payoff 
functions are non-linear as assumed in our model.  Figure 1-(b) illustrates the classification of 
strategies with Cobb-Douglas type indifference curves, which is a diagrammatic representation 
of Table 2.  Investing less than an own payoff-maximizing strategy is a spiteful strategy, and 
investing more than an own payoff-maximizing strategy is an altruistic strategy, given any 
investment level of the other subject. 
 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1-(a) and 1-(b) are around here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
2.4. A Two-Stage Game with Pre-commitment to Contributing Nothing 
 So far we have assumed implicitly that no subjects are allowed to pre-commit to 
contributing zero in the voluntary contribution mechanism.  However, Saijo and Yamato 
(1999) found that there is a wide class of public goods provision mechanisms where subjects 
have incentives to pre-commit to investing nothing for public goods.  The voluntary 
contribution mechanism is one of them. Consider now a two-stage game (see Figure 2).  In the 
first stage, each subject simultaneously decides whether or not she should commit to investing 
zero in the voluntary contribution mechanism without knowing the other subject's decision.  In 
the second stage, each subject decides how many units of her initial endowment she should 
invest after knowing the other subject's commitment decision.   
-------------------------------- 
Figure 2 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 Notice that commitment to investing zero is different from zero investment without 
commitment.  Once subject a decides not to commit to investing zero, subject b must take 
account of this fact when she chooses her investment number without knowing subject a's 
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investment number.  On the other hand, if subject a chooses zero commitment, then subject b 
knows that subject a invests nothing. 
 In our experiment, subjects choose integer investment numbers only.  If neither of 
subjects decide to commit to investing zero, then the Nash equilibrium of that subgame is for 
each subject to contribute 8 and obtain a payoff of 7345.  If one subject commits to investing 
zero and the other does not, then the subject who chose non-commitment maximizes her 
payoff at yi = 11  and obtains a payoff of 2658, and the subject who chose commitment clearly 
invests nothing and obtains a payoff of 8278.  If both subjects choose to commit to investing 
zero, both end up with a payoff of 706.  These subgame perfect payoffs are incorporated into 
the normal form game payoff table shown in Table 3. 
 
 -------------------------------- 
Table 3 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
  
The game in Table 3 is a well-known Hawk-Dove game.  Although the usual 
simplification of the public good problem is a Prisoners' Dilemma game, we find that the 
proper simplification is a Hawk-Dove game when we allow subjects to commit to investing 
zero .  There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: either one of subjects commits to investing 
zero.  One more Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy equilibrium: each subject i chooses 0.68 
as her non-commitment probability pi .  Among these three equilibria, the mixed strategy 
equilibrium is a unique ESS equilibrium.8        
 
2.5. Own Payoff-Maximizing, Spiteful, and Altruistic Strategies 
For the two-stage game with pre-commitment to contributing nothing, we define own 
payoff-maximizing, spiteful, and altruistic investment strategies at the second stage in the 
same way as in Section 2.2 for the usual voluntary contribution mechanism.  
When one subject decides not to commit to investing zero, but the other subject decides 
to commit to investing zero, the strategies of the former non-committing subject are classified 
as follows:   
                                                     
8 See Maynard Smith (1982). Although expected payoffs from Commit and Not Commit are of course equal in 
the mixed strategy equilibrium, as an anonymous referee points out Commit is considerably riskier (payoff 
standard deviation of 3542) than Not Commit (payoff standard deviation of 2193). This could discourage risk 
averse subjects from committing to investing zero in this two-stage game. 
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(i) Investing 11 is an own payoff-maximizing strategy. In this case, the non-committing 
subject gets 2658 (see the number in cell   of Table 2), while the other subject earns 8278 (the 
number in cell m).    
(ii) Investing less than 11 is a spiteful strategy. For example, if the non-committing 
subject invests 7 instead of 11, her own payoff is reduced from 2658 to 2210 (the number in cell 
n), and the payoff of the other subject is also reduced from 8278 to 4018 (the number in cell p). 
(iii) Investing more than 11 is an altruistic strategy.  For instance, by investing 17 
instead of 11, her own payoff is reduced from 2658 to 1871 (the number in cell q), while the 
payoff of the other subject increases from 8278 to 18539 (the number in cell r).  
When no subject pre-commits to contribute nothing, the second stage game 
corresponds to the usual voluntary contribution mechanism game, and thus the definitions of 
spiteful and altruistic strategies are the same as those defined in Section 2.2.   
The subgame perfect equilibrium analysis in the previous subsection 2.4 is based on 
the assumption that each subject chooses an own payoff-maximizing investment strategy. 
However, we observed different types of strategies in our experiments, in particular spiteful 
strategies. As we discuss in the results, this dramatically changes the nature of the first stage 
commitment decision game. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
 Our experiment consisted of three treatments, A, B, and B’. Treatment A corresponded 
to the voluntary contribution mechanism without pre-commitment to investing zero and 
Treatments B and B’ corresponded to the voluntary contribution mechanism with a pre-
commitment decision.  We will explain the difference between Treatment B and Treatment B’ 
below.  
 We conducted one session in Treatment A and one session in Treatment B at the 
University of Tsukuba during December of 1995, one session in Treatment B and one session in 
Treatment B’ at the Tokyo Metropolitan University during December of 1997, and one session 
in Treatment A at Tokyo Institute of Technology during December of 2001.  All sessions 
employed 20 subjects, so the five sessions reported here employed a total of 100 different 
student subjects. We recruited these students for each session by campus-wide advertisement.  
These students were told that there would be an opportunity to earn money in a research 
experiment.  None of them had prior experience in a public good provision experiment.  No 
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subject attended in more than one session.  The Treatment A session required approximately 
90 minutes and the Treatment B and B’ sessions required approximately two hours to 
complete.  The mean payoff per subject was $28.38 ($1=100 yen).  The maximum payoff among 
the one hundred subjects was $45.53, and the minimum payoff was $17.28.9 
 Let us describe Treatment A first.  Twenty subjects seated at desks in a relatively large 
room had random identification numbers.  These identification numbers were not publicly 
displayed, however, so subjects could not determine who had which number.  We made ten 
pairs out of twenty subjects.  In each round, ten pairs played the game without the 
commitment decision as described in the previous section.  The pairings were anonymous and 
were determined in advance by experimenters so as not to pair the same two subjects more 
than once – a so-called “strangers” design.  The first four rounds were for practice and the 
remaining fifteen determined the subjects' monetary payoffs.  Each subject received an 
experimental procedure sheet, a record sheet, payoff tables, 15 investment sheets, and 4 
practice investment sheets.10  Instructions were given by tape recorder to minimize the 
interaction between subjects and experimenters.   
Each subject determined her investment by selecting an integer number between 0 and 
24 by using payoff tables and then marked this number on an investment sheet.  
Experimenters collected these investment sheets and then redistributed them only to the 
paired subjects. No information (such as the sum of investment numbers) or decisions were 
publicly announced. During the redistribution, subjects were asked to fill out the reasons why 
they chose these numbers.  After the redistribution of investment cards, subjects calculated 
their payoffs from the payoff tables.  Then the next round started. 
 Treatment B had one additional step.  Before choosing investment numbers, subjects 
decided whether or not they would commit to investing zero.  In the experiment, we used the 
term “participate (resp. not paticipate) in investment” instead of “not commit (resp. commit) to 
investing zero.”  These decisions were collected by experimenters and then redistributed only 
to their paired subjects. No information (such as the total number of subjects who chose 
                                                     
9 We paid higher earnings to the subjects at Tokyo Institute of Technology than at the other two universities, 
because Tokyo Institute of Technology is located at the center of Tokyo, while the others at local towns. 
10 The use of practice periods permits subjects to send signals costlessly prior to the paid rounds.  However, 
subjects interacted with each other in only one period and there was no public information after the 
instructions were completed and data collection began.  Therefore, the impact of these signals is somewhat 
limited.  Nevertheless, see footnote 18 for some minor evidence of spillover from the practice periods. 
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commitment) or decisions were publicly announced. After the redistribution of the 
commitment decisions, subjects who decided not to commit to investing zero chose their 
investment numbers on investment sheets by circling an integer between 0 and 24.  In order to 
not reveal the number of subjects who chose commitment and to obscure the identity of those 
subjects, even those who had chosen to commit to zero also filled out this investment sheet, 
circling the phrase “Not Participate” (i.e., commit to investing zero). Experimenters collected 
these investment sheets and then redistributed them only to the paired subjects.  
 Treatment B’ is exactly the same as Treatment B except for the term that was used to 
describe the person that each subject is matched with at each period.  The term "your 
opponent" was employed in the instructions, record sheets and payoff tables for both 
Treatment A and Treatment B.  The phrase "the person you are paired with" replaced  "your 
opponent" in all materials of Treatment B’.  One might say that the term “opponent” forces 
subjects to think in relative terms.  However, there was no essential difference between the 
results for Treatment B and those for Treatment B’, as we document below.          
 Every subject had the same payoff function and every subject knew this fact.  We 
distributed three kinds of payoff tables to minimize the likelihood of any possible 
misunderstanding, and all of the one hundred subjects were able to readily calculate their 
payoffs following the instructions and practice periods.  The payoff tables used in Treatments 
A and B are Tables 1, 4, and 5.  Table 1 is a detailed payoff table. We also presented a payoff 
table summarizing average payoffs for sets of 9 or 12 payoff cells shown in Table 4, as well as 
an iso-payoff map of Table 5. The payoff tables distributed in Treatment B’ are the same as 
Tables 1, 4, and 5 except that the term "your opponent" is replaced by the term "the person you 
are paired with".  Most subjects indicated in their post-experiment questionnaire that they 
understood all three kinds of payoff tables and used the detailed payoff table (Table 1) only.  
We allowed subjects three minutes to examine the three payoff tables before the practice 
rounds and ten minutes to examine the three new payoff tables before the real rounds.  The 
tables used for practice and real rounds were different. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Tables 4 and 5 are around here 
--------------------------------------------- 
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4. Experimental Results for Treatment A 
The session in Treatment A conducted at the University of Tsukuba and the session in 
Treatment A at Tokyo Institute of Technology (TIT) are called the Tsukuba A session and TIT 
A session, respectively. The data from these two sessions are statistically indistinguishable in 
virtually all rounds (see the Appendix). This provides strong evidence that the experiment site 
(Tsukuba versus Tokyo) does not affect choices. Thus, in the subsequent analysis we pool the 
data across the two Treatment A sessions. 
Treatment A was a control treatment intended to permit a comparison between 
without and with pre-commitment. The Nash equilibrium investment pair was (8, 8), and no 
other Nash equilibrium exists.  Since each round had 10 pairs and 15 rounds were conducted at 
each of the two treatment A sessions, we have 300 pairs of data. The order of investment 
numbers does not matter, so we rearranged each pair (x,y)  with x y≥ .  Figure 3 shows the 
frequency distribution of investment data.   The maximum frequency pair was (8, 7) with 73 
pairs, the second was (8, 8) with 69 pairs, the third was (8,6) with 26 pairs, and the fourth was 
(7, 7) with 18 pairs.  The average investment across all forty subjects was 7.31.  
 
-------------------------------- 
Figure 3 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 Figure 4 shows the average investment pattern from round 1 to 15.  The average 
investment was less than the Nash equilibrium level of investment (8) in all rounds.  In order 
to understand why this happened, we checked the record sheets and questionnaire sheets of 
subjects.  The record sheet was not only for keeping the investment record but also for 
specifying the reasons why a subject chose her investment numbers.  We found eleven subjects 
who explicitly stated the following reasoning: they estimated that their opponents would chose 
8, and then they chose 6 or 7 because this would make their opponents’ payoffs much lower 
than their own payoffs.  For example, consider the case that subject a chooses 7 and subject b 
chooses 8.  Then subject a obtains 7340, and subject b obtains 6526.  At the Nash equilibrium (8, 
8), both subjects obtain 7345.  From the viewpoint of subject a, the reduction of 5 units of payoff 
is minor, but subject a can make the reduction of subject b's payoff (819) much greater than his 
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own reduction.11 In other words, these subjects took spiteful strategies according to our 
definition in Section 2.2. We label these subjects as spiteful subjects.12 
 
-------------------------------- 
Figure 4 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
 
We now examine how frequently own payoff-maximizing, spiteful, or altruistic 
behavior (defined in Section 2.2) occurs in the data. There are several ways in which subjects’ 
could construct expectations for the investment number of the other subject, and the frequency 
classification of the behavior may depend on types of expectations.  We consider the following 
types: 
1) Nash equilibrium expectation: each subject expects the other subject to choose the Nash 
equilibrium investment, 8.  
2) Cournot expectation: each subject expects the investment number of the other subject 
to be the same as the realized number in the previous period.   
3) An average expectation with a declining weight (fictitious play): each subject has a long 
memory when she decides an investment number, in contrast to the Cournot expectation case 
in which each subject has a short memory length. We consider the following expectation with a 
declining weight.  Let EI t( )  be the expected investment number of the other subject at period t 
                                                     
11 Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, 1985b) observed similar phenomena in Keynesian business cycles and industrial 
organization theory.  A small amount of nonmaximizing behavior may cause some amount of changes at 
equilibrium that is larger in its magnitude than the losses due to nonmaximizing agents. 
12 Those spiteful subjects are subjects #1, #7, #14, and #19 at the University of Tsukuba and subjects #1, #3, #9, 
#11, #16, #17, and #19 at Tokyo Institute of Technology. They chose spiteful strategies at most periods. Their 
specific investment patterns were as follows: 
Tsukuba: a) Subject #1 invested 6 or 7 (less than 8) to spite their opponents in eleven periods, and 
invested 8 in four periods; b) Subject #7 invested 3 in all fifteen periods; c) Subject #14 invested 4 or 7 (less than 
8) in nine periods, and invested 8 in six periods; and d) Subject #19 invested 3, 4, 5, or 6 (less than 8) in six 
periods, invested 8 in five periods, and invested 9, 10, or 12 (more than 8) in four periods.  The first three 
subjects selected spiteful strategies in most periods. The last subject tried large investment numbers until 
period 7. After period 8, however, he adopted spiteful strategies in most rounds: investing less than 8 six 
times, but investing 8 only two times. 
Tokyo Institute of Technology: a) Subject #1 invested 6 or 7 (less than 8) in thirteen periods, and 
invested 9 or 24 (more than 8) in two periods; b) Subject #3 invested 6 or 7 (less than 8) in ten periods, and 
invested 8 in five periods; c) Subject #9 invested 3, 6 or 7 (less than 8) in all fifteen periods; Subject #11 invested 
4, 5, 6, or 7 (less than 8) in eleven periods, invested 8 in three periods, and invested 10 (more than 8) in one 
period; e) Subject #16 invested 0, 2, 4, or 5 (less than 8) in thirteen periods, invested 8 in one period, and 
invested 24 (more than 8) in one period; f) Subject #17 invested 6 or 7 (less than 8) in ten periods, invested 8 in 
three periods, and invested 9 or 11 (more than 8) in two periods; and g) Subject #19 invested 6 or 7 (less than 8) 
in eleven periods, invested 8 in three periods, and invested 9 (more than 8) in one period.  All subjects played 
spiteful strategies in at least ten periods.  
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and I t( )  be the investment number the other subject chose at period t.  Then the next period’s 
expected investment is given by EI t I t t EI t t( ) ( ) ( ) / ( )+ = + × +1 1 . This is simply a 
recursive version of fictitious play expectations. 
Table 6 shows the rates of spiteful, own payoff-maximizing, and altruistic strategies 
chosen by subjects at Treatment A for each type of expectation. For all three types of 
expectations, most data fall into the spiteful strategy region and the own payoff-maximizing 
strategy region, and only a few fall in the altruistic strategy region. In particular, if subjects 
chose strategies randomly, then the rate of altruistic strategies would be 73.40% (the fraction of 
altruistic choices shown in payoff table 2).  However, the actual rates in Table 6 were less than 
12%.  
 
                                                  -------------------------------- 
Table 6 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
 
These spiteful strategy choices tended to reduce average investments below the 
equilibrium level. We tested the hypothesis that mean investment equals the Nash equilibrium 
investment (8) first by pooling investments across rounds.  Because each subject made 15 
investment choices the data are clearly not independent.  Therefore, we accounted for the 
panel nature of the data using a random effects error specification vit = ei + εit, where ei is a 
subject-specific error term and εit is an iid error.  The pooled data strongly reject the Nash 
equilibrium (t=4.47).  We then focused on round by round tests of the Nash equilibrium. A 
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the Nash equilibrium hypothesis at the five 
percent significance level in fourteen out of fifteen rounds (all except round 6). Nevertheless, 
the fact that many subjects chose the Nash equilibrium investment and the mean investments 
are only slightly below 8 indicates that at least economically the Nash equilibrium has 
attracting power for the data. 
 These Treatment A results lead to the following observation. 
 
Observation 1:  
The mean investment across all rounds is significantly less than the Nash equilibrium 
investment.  Overall, mean investments were approximately ten percent below the Nash equilibrium. 
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The above result is similar to the findings in Andreoni (1993) and Chan et al. (2002), 
who studied the crowding out hypothesis in public good experiments with non-linear payoff 
functions and minimum contribution “taxes” in some treatments, though they did not refer to 
spiteful behavior. They also used Cobb-Dougulas type payoff functions and presented 
complete payoff matrices that showed how payoffs depend on both own and other’s 
contributions to the public good, as in our experiments. In both of these previous experiments 
contributions were close to but slightly below the Nash equilibrium prediction at most periods 
when no tax was imposed. The contribution levels did not get closer to the interior Nash 
equilibrium over time, similar to our observation. Laury and Holt (2002) also note that 
complete, detailed payoff information in this type of non-linear environment seems to reduce 
contribution levels. 
These observations are different from those in standard public goods experiments with 
linear payoff functions, where contributions usually exceed the Nash equilibrium level.  
However, only own payoff-maximizing and altruistic strategies can be chosen and no spiteful 
strategy is available with linear payoff functions, as pointed out in Section 2.3.  On the other 
hand, with Cobb-Douglas type payoff functions, all three kinds of strategies, own payoff-
maximizing, spiteful, and altruistic strategies, can be selected. 
 
5. Experimental Results for Treatments B and B’  
 The session in Treatment B conducted at the University of Tsukuba, the session in 
Treatment B at the Tokyo Metropolitan University (TMU), and the session in Treatment B’ at 
the Tokyo Metropolitan University are called the Tsukuba B session, TMU B session, and TMU 
B' session, respectively. As shown in the appendix, the data from these three sessions are 
statistically indistinguishable in virtually all rounds. This provides strong evidence that neither 
the experiment site (Tokyo versus Tsukuba) nor the experiment wording (“your opponent” 
versus “the person you are paired with”) affect choices. Therefore, in the subsequent analysis 
we pool the data across the three Treatment B sessions, i.e., Tsukuba B, TMU B, and TMU B' 
sessions. 
 
5.1 Investment Data  
 Figure 5 shows that the distribution of investment pairs in Treatment B is very 
different from that of Treatment A (Figure 3).  The maximum frequency pair was (8,7) with 57 
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pairs, the second most common was (11,0) with 44 pairs, followed by (8,8) and (0,0) with 37 
pairs each. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Figure 5 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 Also unlike Treatment A, the average investment (including the investments of zero by 
subjects who committed to investing zero) changed across rounds in Treatment B.  Figure 6 
illustrates that the average investment in Treatment B was clearly less than in Treatment A.  
However, the average investment in Treatment B ascended across rounds, and in the late 
rounds the average investments in the two Treatments were similar; for example, in the final 
round the average investments in Treatments A and B were 7.03 and 6.47 respectively.  
According to the nonparametric two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test, the average investments 
are significantly higher in Treatment A than in Treatment B at the 5-percent level in periods 1, 
3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11. Although this is a majority of the periods (8 of 15), note that the 
investments are not significantly different in the A and B treatments in the later periods 12 
through 15. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Figure 6 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
  
Using a random-effects panel data model that is the same as that for Treatment A, we 
tested the hypothesis that mean investment equals the Nash equilibrium investment (8) in the 
case of neither committing to investing zero (the number of observations for this case is 583).  
The mean investment in this case was too low (7.26), and we rejected the hypothesis (t=4.21).13  
This is because several subjects exhibited spiteful behavior as in Treatment A. The rates of 
spiteful, own payoff-maximizing, and altruistic strategies for the case of neither committing at 
Treatment B are shown in Table 6.  Again, most data fall into the spiteful region and the own 
                                                     
13 For those who prefer nonparametric tests, we also conducted Wilcoxon signed rank tests separately for each 
of the 15 periods. This test rejects the null hypothesis that average investment equals 8 at the five percent level 
in 12 of the 15 periods. 
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payoff-maximizing point, and few in the altruistic region for each of three types of 
expectations.14 
However, like the result for Treatment A, a substantial number of subjects selected the 
Nash equilibrium, so the Nash equilibrium is meaningful at least economically in the case of 
neither committing. 
 
5.2 Commitment Data 
 We next examined whether the commitment data in Treatment B were compatible with 
the mixed strategy equilibrium of the Hawk-Dove game described in Table 3.  The null 
hypothesis is the ESS non-commitment probability of 0.68.  We first conducted a binomial test 
separately by round in order to avoid pooling dependent commitment decisions made by the 
same subject in the same test.  Under the ESS null hypothesis, the probability of observing 10 
commitment decisions or less out of 60 is less than one percent, and the probability of 
observing 12 commitment decisions or less out of 60 is less than five percent.  As Figure 7 
shows, the non-commitment rate rose as rounds advanced (although a brief decline was 
observed in rounds 8 and 9).  The smooth curve is a simple log-linear regression.  More to the 
point for this binomial test, the low commitment rate permits the binomial test to reject the ESS 
null hypothesis in 9 rounds of the 15 total rounds (in rounds 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15) at 
the five percent (usually one percent) significance level. 
 
 -------------------------------- 
Figure 7 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
  
We also examined the overall non-commitment rates for each of 60 subjects separately.  
The mean non-commitment rate was 80% (12 of 15 decisions), and the median non-
commitment rate was 86.7% (13 of 15 decisions).  Note that the ESS rate of 0.68 implies on 
average slightly more than 10 non-commitment decisions.  Only 14 of the 60 subjects (23.3%) 
did not commit 10 times or less, while the other 46 subjects (76.6%) did not commit 11 times or 
                                                     
14 The average expectation with a declining weight for Treatment B is defined as follows. Suppose that a 
subject faces the case of neither committing to zero in period t, and the last time she experienced such a case is 
period s t( )< . Let EI t( ) (resp. EI s( ) ) be the expected investment number of the other subject in period t (resp. 
s).  Then EI(t) is given by EI t I s N s EI s N s( ) [ ( ) ( ( ) ) ( )] / ( )= + − ×1 , where I s( )  is the investment number the other  
subject chose in period s and N(s) is the number of the cases of neither committing to zero that the subject has 
experienced between period 1 and period s. 
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more.  15 of the 60 subjects (25%) were apparently using a pure strategy, as they did not 
commit in 15 out of 15 periods. Using the 60 separate subject observations, the data reject the 
ESS prediction of 0.68 at better than the 0.0001 significance level using the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
 Furthermore, we conducted a binomial test of the mixed strategy of p = 0.68 separately 
for each subject.  Under the null hypothesis that subjects play this mixed strategy, commitment 
decisions--even for an individual subject--are statistically independent.  At the five percent 
significance threshold, 23 of 60 subjects (38.3%) did not commit too much (either 14 or 15 
times), rejecting p = 0.68; 6 of 60 subjects (10%) did not commit too little (7 times or less), 
rejecting p = 0.68 in the other direction.  At the ten percent significance threshold, 32 of 60 
subjects (53.3%) did not commit too much (13, 14 or 15 times), rejecting p = 0.68; 9 of 60 subjects 
(15%) did not commit too little (8 times or less), rejecting p = 0.68 in the other direction. 
 
5.3  Why were Non-commitment Rates High? 
 In order to understand these rather high non-commitment rates, consider the case in 
which only one subject in a pair did not commit to contributing zero.  When a subject 
committed to investing zero, the other could obtain her maximum payoff by investing 11 (see 
Table 2).  There were 139 observations with exactly one subject who did not commit.  In these 
cases the person choosing non-commitment invested eleven 43 times, invested less than eleven 
95 times (zero 17 times, invested one 3 times, invested two 7 times, invested three 8 times, 
invested four 7 times, invested five 1 times, invested six 16 times, invested seven 19 times, 
invested eight 9 times, invested nine 6 times, and invested ten 2 times), and invested more than 
eleven (twenty-four) only 1 time.  In fact, the mean investment (6.90) was lower than when 
neither committed!  Using a random effects model, we soundly reject the hypothesis that mean 
investment equals 11 in the case of one subject choosing non-commitment  (t=8.14).15 
 As shown in Table 3, by investing 11 in response to the other committing to investing 
zero, the committing subject earns 8278 while the non-committing subject earns 2658.  On the 
other hand, by investing 7 in this situation, the committing subject earns 4018 while the non-
committing subject earns 2210.  That is, the payoff reduction of the non-committing subject  
                                                     
15 The nonparametric Wilcoxon test rejects the null hypothesis that average investment equals 11 at the five 
percent level in 9 of the 15 periods, even though the average sample size per period is only about 9 because of 
the high non-commitment rate. 
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(448=2658-2210) was relatively small, while the payoff reduction of the committing subject 
(4269=8278-4018) was relatively large.  This appears to be stronger evidence of spiteful 
behavior than we observed in Treatment A.  In fact, for this subgame we observed that over 
two-thirds of the data fall into the spiteful region, and less than on-percent in the altruistic 
region, as shown on the bottom of Table 6.  
One might say that in the two-stage game of Treatment B, the low investment by the 
single non-committing subject could be interpreted as belonging to a tit-for-tat strategy to 
“teach” others to cooperate.  Because subjects were re-paired with a new opponent each period 
and never interacted with the same subject in more than one period, however, such a strategy 
is not subgame perfect. Furthermore, although there is no need to choose a tit-for-tat strategy 
at the final period of the experiment, the spite rate of the final period is equal to 6/9 = 67 
percent.16 
 
5.4 Commitment versus Non-commitment in Actual Payoffs 
 Figure 8 shows average payoffs by round depending on commitment.  Curve α 
denotes the average payoffs when neither subject committed to investing zero.  As Table 3 
shows, the payoff should be 7345 according to the Nash equilibrium prediction, but actual data 
showed that average payoffs were less than 7000 units in all 15 rounds.  Curve β denotes the 
average payoffs when only the other did not commit to investing zero.  According to the Nash 
equilibrium, this should lead to 8278 units of payoff, but actual payoffs were less than 6000 in 
12 of 15 rounds.  Even more striking it that according to Table 3, curve β should be above curve 
α, but Figure 8 shows that curve α was above curve β in all but round 9. These average payoff 
curves are significantly different at the 5-percent level according to a nonparametric two-
sample Wilcoxon test in periods 4, 7, 8, 10 and 12 (two-tailed tests).17 Table 7 illustrates the 
payoff matrix for commitment decisions, which is based on the average values of payoffs 
subjects actually obtained up to round 5, rather than the subgame equilibrium payoffs as 
shown in Table 3.  As this table illustrates, non-commitment became a dominant strategy even 
in early rounds. 
                                                     
16 The full distribution of the 9 final period observations with exactly one non-committing subject is as follows: 
one subject invested two, one subject invested seven, three subjects invested eight, one subject invested nine, 
and three subjects invested eleven. 
17 In this test we only employ one observation from each pair of subjects for each period (their average payoff 
if neither commits to zero) since the two payoffs in a pair are not independent. 
23 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 8 and Table 7 are around here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Our interpretation of “as if subjects play a dominant strategy game” is based on subject 
learning and proceeds roughly as follows.  After inspection of the payoff tables, some subjects 
initially commit to investing zero hoping the other will not commit and invest 11.  They 
therefore expect (perhaps with the ESS probability of 0.68) to receive a payoff of 8278.  
However, since their non-committing opponent invested less than 11, the subject realized that 
her earnings in this subgame fell below 6000 on average.  After learning this, she chose not to 
commit to investing zero in later rounds and frequently earned more than 6000.18 
 
5.5  Learning Processes for Non-commitment   
 Essentially, subjects learn (contrary to the ESS equilibrium) that expected profits from 
non-commitment tend to exceed those from commitment.  In this subsection we provide a 
simple model of this learning process.  Many alternative approaches to learning have been 
advanced recently in the literature, including reinforcement learning (e.g., Erev and Roth, 
1998), belief-based learning (Cheung and Friedman, 1997), and creative hybrid approaches 
(e.g., Camerer and Ho, 1999). Rather than provide an exhaustive evaluation of the various 
learning models using our data, we just report results of a simple adaptive learning model in 
which the commitment choice is reinforced based on previous earnings. In particular, we 
estimate a probit model in which the probability of non-commitment depends on the ratio of 
expected non-commitment earnings (ENCE) to expected commitment earnings (ECE): 
 
                                                     
18 As Figure 11 in the appendix shows, the average non-commitment rates at early rounds in the TMU B 
session were relatively high.  To see why this happened, we looked at the record sheets for the four practice 
periods, since the experiences of subjects in the practice periods might affect their commitment decisions in the 
actual experiment.  We found that spiteful behavior during the practice periods would lead to high non-
commitment rates in early periods.  First of all, we counted the number of subjects who explicitly wrote that 
they realized that commitment was not beneficial because the non-committing subject would act spitefully in 
the practice periods.  This number in the TMU B session (8) was much larger than both that in the TMU B’ 
session (1) and that in the Tsukuba B session (1).  We also calculated the number of subjects who had no 
chance to experience spiteful behavior in the practice periods.  Consider a subject who experienced the 
following: (a) no cases in which only one subject did not commit , or (b) if only one subject did not commit 
(either himself or his opponent), the payoff-maximizing (non-spiteful) investment was selected. Call such a 
subject a "spite-free" subject.  The number of spite-free subjects in the TMU B session was 5,  the number in the 
TMU B' session was 8, and at the number in the Tsukuba B session was 11.  As the number of spite-free 
subjects was larger, the non-commitment rate at period 1 was smaller. 
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(2)                                   Probability(Non-commitment) = f (ENCE/ECE), 
 
where f is the normal density function ( e x−
2 2 2/ / π ) since this is estimated as a probit model. 
 The next step is to specify the process underlying subjects' expectations.  In terms of 
Camerer and Ho’s (1999) experienced-weighted attraction (EWA) model—which nests basic 
choice reinforcement and belief-based learning models as special cases—we assume that 
hypothetical payoffs to strategies not chosen are not updated (i.e., EWA parameter δ = 0 ), as 
in many reinforcement learning models, and so they do not affect expectations. A 
reinforcement learning approach seems most plausible for our design with randomly re-paired 
subjects, since this design feature prevents subjects from developing beliefs about individual 
players. We update profit expectations following a commitment or a non-commitment choice, 
and we use two polar cases for this simple model:  (1) Cournot (or myopic) expectations and 
(2) Fictitious Play expectations (e.g., Cheung and Friedman, 1997; Cox and Walker, 1998). 
 According to Cournot, ENCE are simply the realized earnings the last time the subject 
did not commit; and ECE are simply the realized earnings the last time the subject committed.  
In other words, subjects maintain a very short (myopic) memory length--of one observation for 
each (commit or not) decision.  This is consistent with EWA parameters ρ φ= = 0 , since 
previous experience completely depreciates. By contrast, according to Fictitious Play, subjects 
have a long memory, and each observation updates the expectation with a declining weight.  
For example, if a subject has not committed N times up to this round, and they did not commit 
in this round, they update ENCE as follows: 
 
(3)                   ENCE=((N*previous ENCE)+current non-commitment earnings)/(N+1). 
 
In other words, as subjects accumulate evidence they simply include it in their running 
average of the payoffs from non-commitment for ENCE.  ECE is, of course, analogous. This 
fictitious play alternative is consistent with EWA parameters ρ φ= = 1  since all observations 
count equally.19 
                                                     
19 For both Cournot and Fictitious Play, we need the expectations to start somewhere when no evidence has yet 
accumulated.  For these initial expectations we employ the ESS expected payoffs, which are 5829 for both 
ENCE and ECE.  Therefore, the ENCE/ECE ratio is 1 in round 1. 
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 The empirical model is probit maximum likelihood, with a random subject effect.  
Table 8 presents the estimation results separately and pooled for the three Treatment B 
sessions.  For Fictitious Play, the expected payoff ratio is insignificantly different from zero 
except in the TMU B session, where the coefficient estimate has the wrong sign. For the 
Cournot specification, the ratio is significantly positive except in the TMU B session.  The 
positive coefficient on the ratio implies that as the relative profitability of non-commitment 
increases, the likelihood of non-commitment increases.  So, we can conclude that (1) subjects' 
non-commitment decisions respond to their experience, and (2) subjects appear to update their 
expectations in this environment using a short (Cournot) memory length. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Table 8 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
  
Summarizing the above observations, we have the following. 
 
Observation 2:  
(a)The ESS prediction regarding the non-commitment rate is rejected. 
(b) The non-commitment rate rises as rounds advanced and the average investment in 
Treatment B is not significantly different from that in Treatment A after period 12. 
(c) It seems that the reason why the rate of non-committing subjects increases is not altruism or 
kindness but is spiteful behavior of subjects.  Subjects learn that commitment to investing zero will 
invoke a spiteful response, which reduces the payoff of commitment below the payoff of non-commitment. 
 
5.6 An Evaluation of Our Observations using Recent Models of Social Preferences 
The choices observed in our experiment could be consistent with notions of “inequality 
aversion” or reciprocal altruism advanced recently by some researchers (for example, see 
Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (1998), 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002) and Costa-
Gomes and Zauner (2001)). Our experiment was not designed to differentiate between these 
alternative models, so we do not wish to overstate what our experiment can say about them. 
Nevertheless, a brief evaluation of our results in the context of these new models is 
worthwhile. 
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 In Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model subjects have “inequity aversion,” so they prefer 
higher but more equal earnings among participants in their group. Utility payoffs are equal to 
monetary payoffs less inequity costs that rise as the difference between a subject’s own and 
other’s monetary payoff increases.20 In the model some subjects suffer both from earning more 
as well as earning less than their counterparts, but the cost of advantageous inequality is 
assumed to be no more than the cost of disadvantageous inequality. Fehr and Schmidt 
demonstrate that their model can describe many outcomes in ultimatum games, market games 
with both proposer and responder competition, as well linear voluntary contribution 
mechanism games with and without punishment opportunities. They even go as far as to 
derive parameter distributions of the relative tradeoff of monetary gains and inequity aversion 
that describes behavior across games, which we can use to assess conveniently the 
effectiveness of this approach in describing the new data reported here. Applying their 
distribution of preferences to our subjects, it is straightforward to show that when only one 
subject does not commit to investing zero, the optimal contribution is 11 for 30 percent of the 
subjects (these 30 percent are standard “money-maximizers”), is 6 for 30 percent of the 
subjects, is 4 for another 30 percent of the subjects, and is 1 for the remaining 10 percent.21 The 
mean of this distribution is 6.4. 
 The distribution of contributions in our data is remarkably close to this predicted 
distribution if one makes allowances for a bit of choice error for the lower contributions. When 
they are the only non-committing subject, 32 percent of our subjects contributed 11, 26 percent 
contributed 6 or 7, 11 percent contributed 3 or 4, and 13 percent contributed 0 or 1. The close 
correspondence between our Japanese data and the Fehr and Schmidt model predictions may 
at first seem surprising, because the model parameters were calibrated using data collected in 
Europe and North America. However, the Fehr and Schmidt model—and all the related 
models just cited—are culturally neutral and so they should apply to non-Western cultures as 
well. 
 A drawback of the approach taken by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) is that they model players’ utilities as depending only on the final payoff 
                                                     
20 In particular, for a two-person game player i’s utility is U x x x x x xi i i j i i i j( ) , ,= − − − −α β max{ }  max{ }0 0 , 
i j≠ , where xk  denotes monetary earnings ( k i j= , ), α βi j≥ , and 1 0> ≥βi .  
21 For this calculation one only needs the distribution of α , because the non-committing subject’s earnings are 
always lower than the committing subject’s earnings. β  is only used for cases of advantageous inequality. We 
use Fehr and Schmidt’s distribution of α ={0, 0.5, 1, 4} in proportions of {0.3, 0.3, 0.3, 0.1}. 
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allocations and not on players’ intensions. Rabin’s (1993) fairness equilibrium, Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger’s (2002) model of sequential reciprocity, and Charness and Rabin’s (2002) 
model of social preferences allow for (positive or negative) reciprocal behavior based on how 
kind or unkind a player believes his opponent is treating him. Our experiment provides fairly 
clear evidence that non-committing subjects act spitefully to punish committing subjects, or in 
other words they exhibit negative reciprocal behavior. 22 For example, note from Table 6 that 
the rate of spiteful strategy choices increases from about 50 percent to about 70 percent when 
subjects must make an investment that benefits a subject who has committed to an investment 
of zero. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We found that the ESS prediction in a Hawk-Dove game was rejected and the number 
of non-committing subjects increased across time.  Furthermore, this increase did not arise due 
to altruism or kindness among subjects, but from spiteful behavior of subjects.  Acting 
spitefully in this way is costly, and this kind of spiteful or negative reciprocal behavior has also 
been observed recently by independent research on public goods (Fehr and Gachter, 2000) and 
in the ultimatum game (Ochs and Roth, 1989 and Prasnikar and Roth, 1992). 
In neo-classical economic theory, it is assumed that each agent cares only about himself 
and maximizes his own payoff subject to some constraints. If people care about how they are 
doing relative to others (for example, see Hume, 1739),23 however, then it is natural to think 
that they might often take spiteful actions in an attempt to decrease the happiness of others. 
One would think that such spiteful behavior might result in outcomes that are socially inferior 
to outcomes arising from the interaction of purely selfish individuals. We find that the 
opposite may occur: spitefulness leads to cooperation in the sense that the number of subjects 
who do not commit to contributing nothing to the provision of a public good increases. This 
                                                     
22 This is different from simple rivalistic behavior in which a subject seeks merely to earn more than his 
opponent earns.  The data are inconsistent with such rivalistic motivations, because such motivations are more 
likely to lead to less non-commitment than the ESS prediction since commitment guarantees payoffs greater 
than or equal to those of the opponent.  It is also unlikely that rivalistic choices would be so close to the Nash 
equilibrium when neither subject commits because rivalistic subjects have a strong incentive to reduce their 
public good investment. 
23 “Now as we seldom judge of objects from their intrinsic value, but form our notions of them from a 
comparison with other objects; it follows, that according as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or 
misery in others, we must make an estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure.  The misery of 
another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness, and his happiness of our misery.  The former, therefore, 
produces delight; and the latter uneasiness.” (David Hume, 1739) 
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finding suggests a need to rethink our fundamental assumptions of human nature underlying 
our models. 
 Isaac and Walker (1998) also conducted public good provision experiments with 
interior Nash equilibria and examined how the location of the aggregate Nash equilibrium, 
relative to the group’s aggregate endowment, influences contributions to a public good.  They 
observed that (i) when the equilibrium was low relative to the endowment (19.4%), 
contributions were greater than the equilibrium; and (ii) when the equilibrium was in the 
middle of the endowment space (50%), contributions tracked the equilibrium at initial and 
middle rounds, but declined below it by final rounds. For our Treatment A and Treatment B 
when neither commits, the ratio of the individual Nash equilibrium level to the individual 
endowment was 33.3% (=8/24). This is between Isaac and Walker’s “low Nash” treatment 
(19.4%) and “middle Nash” treatment (50%), but neither of their treatment results was similar 
to ours. One of the reasons for this difference might be how payoff information was given to 
subjects. Isaac and Walker provided each subject a rough payoff table, from which it was not 
easy to see the payoffs of the other subjects. On the other hand, we gave each subject a detailed 
payoff table to understand the payoff structure of the other subject, which might trigger 
spiteful behavior.  In future experiments we plan to conduct a systematic exploration of this 
information effect.   
It is also possible that spiteful behavior is more likely in two-person games such as this 
because it encourages relative payoff comparison and because it permits punishments that can 
be directed to specific individuals. Future experiments can test this conjecture using larger 
groups. Finally, the ESS non-commitment rate in the present experiment was 0.68.  We are 
currently conducting experiments in which the rate is less than 0.5. 
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APPENDIX: 
1. Comparisons of Tsukuba A and TIT A Sessions 
Figure 9 illustrates how the average investment, which equals the sum of investment 
numbers divided by the number of subjects, changed from round 1 to 15 for each of the two A 
sessions.  According to the nonparametric two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test, the 
investments in the two A sessions are statistically different in only one of the 15 periods at the 
five percent significance level.24 
 
-------------------------------- 
Figure 9 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. Comparisons of Tsukuba B, TMU B, and TMU B’ Sessions 
First of all, we compare investments conditional on non-commitment across the three B 
and B’ sessions.  Figure 10 illustrates how the average investment conditional on non-
commitment, which equals the sum of investment numbers for non-committing subjects 
divided by the number of non-committing subjects, changed from round 1 to 15 for each of the 
three B and B’ sessions.  The average investments conditional on non-commitment were 
different in only a handful of periods according to the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
In 14 of the 15 periods there is no statistical difference between the TMU B and TMU B’ 
sessions at the five percent significance level, which indicates that the “opponent” wording did 
not affect investments conditional on non-commitment.25  Likewise, the TMU B and Tsukuba B 
sessions are not statistically different in 12 of the 15 periods, indicating that investments 
conditional on non-commitment differed very little across sites.26  
 
-------------------------------- 
Figure 10 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 Figure 11 illustrates the average non-commitment rate patterns from round 1 to 15 in 
Tsukuba B session, TMU B session, and TMU B’ session.  There are some statistically 
significant differences in the non-commitment rates between the Tsukuba B and TMU B 
                                                     
24 In period 11 the average investment in the TIT A session was significantly higher than in the Tsukuba A 
session. 
25 In period 8 the average investment in the TMU B’ session was significantly higher than in the TMU B 
session. 
26 The average investment was significantly higher in the Tsukuba B session in periods 1, 9 and 13. 
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sessions in periods 1 and 2.27 After period 2, there are basically no systematic differences 
among the non-commitment rates across sessions.28 
 
-------------------------------- 
Figure 11 is around here 
-------------------------------- 
 
  Overall, we conclude that there are virtually no statistically significant differences in 
the data based on the experiment site or the experiment wording. 
                                                     
27 Fisher’s exact test p-values for the TMU B versus Tsukuba B comparison are 0.022 in period 1 and 0.020 in 
period 2. We discuss the reasons for these differences in footnote 18.  Fisher’s exact test uses the 
hypergeometric probability distribution to calculate the exact probability of observing the distribution of non-
non-commitment rates (and those more unequally distributed) under the null hypothesis of no differences in 
rates across treatments. 
28 In period 5 the non-commitment rate is significantly higher in the TMU B’ session than in the TMU B 
session, but in period 10 the non-commitment rate is significantly lower in the TMU B’ session than in the 
TMU B session. 
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Your Investment Number
Your
Payoff
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
0 706 871 1072 1297 1536 1775 2003 2210 2386 2523 2615 2658 2648 2585 2470 2309 2106 1871 1614 1349 1091 858 669 543 500
1 905 1127 1379 1647 1919 2183 2427 2641 2816 2944 3019 3039 3001 2905 2755 2555 2313 2038 1743 1443 1154 894 685 548 500
Your 2 1186 1465 1764 2072 2374 2658 2913 3129 3297 3411 3465 3456 3385 3252 3061 2819 2534 2217 1881 1543 1220 933 703 552 500
Opponent's 3 1554 1888 2232 2575 2902 3202 3463 3675 3831 3925 3952 3911 3801 3626 3391 3102 2770 2406 2027 1648 1290 973 721 556 500
Investment 4 2017 2401 2787 3160 3508 3817 4078 4281 4420 4488 4483 4403 4250 4028 3743 3404 3020 2608 2181 1759 1363 1015 740 561 500
Number 5 2578 3010 3432 3831 4193 4507 4762 4950 5064 5101 5057 4934 4733 4459 4119 3725 3287 2821 2344 1877 1441 1060 760 566 500
6 3244 3718 4171 4590 4960 5272 5515 5681 5766 5765 5677 5504 5249 4918 4519 4065 3568 3045 2516 2000 1522 1106 781 571 500
7 4018 4529 5008 5440 5812 6115 6339 6478 6526 6481 6343 6114 5800 5406 4944 4425 3866 3282 2696 2129 1607 1155 802 576 500
8 4904 5447 5944 6383 6751 7038 7237 7340 7345 7250 7056 6765 6385 5924 5393 4806 4179 3532 2886 2265 1696 1206 825 582 500
9 5907 6475 6984 7422 7779 8043 8209 8271 8225 8073 7816 7458 7007 6472 5867 5207 4508 3793 3084 2407 1789 1259 849 588 500
10 7031 7616 8130 8561 8897 9132 9257 9270 9168 8951 8624 8193 7664 7051 6367 5628 4854 4067 3292 2555 1886 1315 874 594 500
11 8278 8873 9384 9800 10109 10306 10384 10339 10173 9886 9482 8970 8359 7661 6892 6070 5217 4354 3509 2710 1987 1372 899 600 500
12 9653 10250 10750 11142 11416 11567 11589 11480 11242 10877 10390 9791 9090 8302 7444 6534 5596 4654 3736 2871 2092 1432 926 606 500
13 11158 11749 12229 12589 12820 12916 12875 12694 12376 11925 11349 10656 9860 8976 8022 7019 5992 4967 3972 3039 2201 1494 953 613 500
14 12796 13372 13824 14144 14323 14356 14243 13982 13576 13033 12358 11565 10667 9681 8627 7526 6406 5292 4217 3213 2315 1559 982 620 500
15 14570 15123 15538 15808 15925 15888 15694 15344 14844 14199 13420 12520 11514 10419 9258 8055 6836 5631 4473 3394 2433 1626 1012 627 500
16 16484 17003 17372 17583 17630 17513 17229 16783 16179 15426 14535 13521 12399 11191 9918 8606 7285 5984 4738 3582 2555 1695 1042 635 500
17 18539 19016 19328 19471 19439 19232 18850 18299 17583 16714 15704 14568 13324 11995 10605 9180 7751 6350 5013 3777 2681 1767 1074 642 500
18 20739 21163 21409 21474 21353 21047 20559 19893 19057 18064 16926 15661 14290 12834 11320 9776 8235 6730 5298 3978 2812 1841 1107 650 500
19 23086 23447 23617 23594 23374 22960 22355 21566 20602 19476 18203 16803 15296 13706 12063 10395 8737 7123 5593 4187 2947 1917 1141 659 500
20 25583 25870 25954 25832 25504 24972 24241 23319 22218 20951 19536 17992 16342 14614 12835 11038 9257 7531 5899 4403 3087 1996 1176 667 500
21 28231 28433 28420 28190 27743 27083 26217 25154 23907 22491 20924 19230 17431 15556 13636 11704 9796 7953 6214 4625 3231 2078 1212 676 500
22 31034 31141 31020 30670 30094 29296 28285 27071 25669 24095 22370 20516 18561 16533 14465 12393 10354 8388 6540 4855 3380 2162 1249 685 500
23 33993 33993 33753 33273 32557 31611 30445 29071 27505 25764 23872 21852 19733 17546 15325 13106 10930 8838 6877 5092 3533 2248 1287 694 500
24 37111 36993 36622 36001 35135 34030 32699 31155 29416 27500 25432 23239 20949 18595 16214 13843 11525 9303 7224 5337 3691 2337 1326 703 500
Table 1: Detailed Payoff Table
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Table 2: Own payoff-maxizing, spiteful, and altruistic strategies
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Commit
     Not
  commit
(7345,7345)
   Figure 2. The game tree when subjects can choose whether or not 
   they commit to contributing zero in the voluntary provision of 
   a non-excludable public good.
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     Not
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     Not
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7345
7345
2658
8278
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706
7061
2
p1
p2 1 2 p
1 1 p
Not commit
Commit
   Table 3. The payoff table becomes a Hawk-Dove game.
Not commit Commit
Notes: The payoffs (7345, 7345) are based on the Nash equilibrium second stage
investments of (8, 8) when neither commits to investing zero at the first stage (see
Table 2). The payoffs (2658, 8278) (resp. (8278, 2658)) are based on the equilibrium
investments of (0, 11) (resp. (11, 0)) when only player 1 (resp. player 2) commits.
The payoffs are (706, 706) when both commit.  The subgame perfect Nash
equilibria of this initial stage commitment game are non-commitment probabilities
for players 1 and 2 (p1, p2) of (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0.68, 0.68). The unique Evolutionary
Stable Strategy (ESS) is (p1, p2) = (0.68, 0.68).
Your Investment Number
Your
Payoff 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
0
1
2 1484 2446 3066 3246 2902 2127 1200
Your
3
Opponent's
4
Investment
5 3245 4512 5057 4921 4109 2821 1460
Number
6
7
8 5705 7036 7332 6749 5383 3536 1724
9
10
11 9122 10295 10154 8952 6883 4364 2024
12
13
14 13575 14338 13553 11545 8620 5310 2364
15
16
17 19132 19206 17555 14548 10603 6376 2743
18
19
20 25855 24939 22187 17973 12838 7567 3163
21
22
23 33800 31573 27472 21836 15336 8887 3626
24
Table 4.  Summary Payoff Table
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Table 5. Iso-Payoff Map 
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Figure 3. Investment Pattern for Treatment A.
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Figure 4. Average Investment Pattern for Treatment A.
Average Investment Pattern
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
A
ve
ra
ge
 In
ve
st
m
en
t
Treatment A
Nash Equilibrium
Expectation Spiteful
strategies (%)
Own payoff-
maximizing
strategies (%)
Altruistic
strategies (%)
Random choice: ratios in Table 2 22.40
(=140/625)
4.16
(=26/625)
73.40
(=459/625)
Nash 43.83
(=263/600)
48.50
(=291/600)
7.67
(=46/600)
Cournot 49.96
(=263/560)
41.79
(=234/560)
11.25
(=63/560)
Treatment A
Average
(Fictitious Play)
45.18
(=253/560)
43.21
(=242/560)
11.61
(=65/560)
Nash 52.32
(=305/583)
34.48
(=201/583)
13.21
(=78/583)
Cournot 48.57
(=254/523)
35.18
(=184/523)
16.25
(=85/523)
Treatment B:
Neither
commits.
Average
(Fictitious Play)
48.76
(=255/523)
34.80
(=182/523)
16.44
(=86/523)
Treatment B: Only one commits. 68.35
(=95/139)
30.93
(=43/139)
0.72
(=1/139)
* For Cournot and average (fictitious play) expectations, we exclude the first investment
choice of each subject for Treatment A and Treatment B when neither commits.  Thus the
number of observations to count for Treatment A is 600-40=560, and that for Treatment B
when neither commits is 583-60=523.
Table 6.  Ratios of Spiteful, Own Payoff-Maximizing, and Altruistic Strategies Chosen by
Subjects.
Figure 5. Investment Pattern in the Three Treatment B Sessions.
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Figure 6.  Comparison of Average  Investment Patterns:
 Treatment A versus Treatment B.
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Figure 7. Non-commitment Rate Pattern.
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Figure 8.  Average Payoffs by Commitment  Decision.
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Table 7. The average values of payoff data up to round 5 
               for the three treatment B sessions.
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Dependent Variable =  1  if Not commit 
                                         0  if Commit 
 
Probit Model with random subject effect 
 
           Model (1):  Cournot Expectations   Model (2):  Fictitious Play 
Expectations 
Variable or Statistic Tsukuba 
B 
Tokyo 
B 
Tokyo 
B’ 
B and B’ 
Pooled 
Tsukuba 
B 
Tokyo 
B 
Tokyo 
B’ 
B and B’ 
Pooled 
(Expected Non-commitment 
Earnings)/ (Expected Commitment 
Earnings) 
0.051* 
(0.022) 
-0.044 
(0.043) 
0.086** 
(0.031) 
0.028* 
(0.015) 
-0.013 
(0.054) 
-0.132* 
(0.064) 
0.131 
(0.193) 
-0.002 
(0.025) 
Intercept 0.618** (0.187) 
1.279** 
(0.224) 
1.126** 
(0.241) 
1.010** 
(0.115) 
0.915** 
(0.211) 
1.312** 
(0.240) 
0.935** 
(0.222) 
1.073** 
(0.120) 
Rhoa 0.382* (0.165) 
0.339 
(0.221) 
0.447* 
(0.191) 
0.344** 
(0.100) 
0.280* 
(0.137) 
0.371* 
(0.176) 
0.382* 
(0.193) 
0.333** 
(0.094) 
Number of Observations 300 300 300 900 300 300 300 900 
Estimated Log-likelihood -147.3 -123.7 -129.8 -405.6 -149.0 -122.7 -130.0 -406.7 
Restricted (slopes=0) Log-likelihood -161.6 -136.5 -145.8 -450.1 -161.6 -136.5 -145.8 -450.1 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level; ** denotes significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level (all 
two-tailed tests except for (Expected Non-commitment Earnings)/(Expected Commitment Earnings). 
aRho is a standard Hausman test statistic for the presence of random effects. 
 
 
 
Table 8.  Results of Probit Commitment Model 
Figure 9. Average Investment Pattern for Treatment A.
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Figure 10.  The Average Investment Patterns Conditional on Non-commitment in Tsukuba B, Tokyo B, and Tokyo B' Sessions.
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Figure 11. The Average Non-commitment Rate Patterns
in Tsukuba B, Tokyo B, and Tokyo B' Sessions.
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
(
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
N
o
n
-
c
o
m
m
i
t
t
i
n
g
 
S
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
)
/
(
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
A
l
l
 
S
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
)
Tokyo B Tokyo B'
Tsukuba B
